The Afghan War: Part II
September 24th 2009 21:13
Bob Woodward of the Washington Post released a purloined copy of a memo that General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, United States Forces in Afghanistan, was instructed to prepare for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. McChrystal was instructed to assess the situation in Afghanistan, and recommend the best course of action.
Since the release of the memo, those on the left have used it to bolster their arguments that the Afghan war is unwinnable, and we should leave immediately before the life of another American serviceman is lost. Those on the right have used it bolster their arguments that we have to flood Afghanistan with more troops to try to recapture as much ground as possible and protect the population centers. Neither the Left nor the Right is correct in their interpretation of McChrystal’s assessment of the situation; all they’ve been doing is spouting their typical sound bites to polarize anyone within ear shot. I read the memo, and here is what McChrystal says:
1.The plan has always been to “disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan.” (Commander’s Summary)
2.“A perception that our resolve is uncertain makes the Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.”
3.“ISAF (NATO’s International Security Assistance Force) requires more forces.”
4.“The greater resources will not be sufficient to achieve success, but will enable implementation of the new strategy. Conversely, inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced.”
5.The strategy has to change from seizing territory to supporting the population. This will be done by building up the Afghan National Security Forces and partnering with them in the battle against the insurgents, putting the Afghan National Security Forces in the forefront in the interaction between the people and NATO security forces, assist in assuring that the Afghan government reaches down to the people instead of staying holed up in the capital, assist in assuring that the government is responsive to the needs of the people by providing security to the courts and local officials against the insurgents, change the focus from destroying poppies, which account for only about 4% of the insurgents income, to facilitating infrastructure growth, and promote overall stability for the general population.
6.Achieve these goals by focusing on population centers.
7.Success will be measured, not by wiping out the insurgency, but by making the population feel secure enough to turn to a legitimate, responsive, trustworthy, strong, localized Afghan government instead of the insurgents. Then, the insurgents will become irrelevant.
8.Nowhere in the memo does McChrystal identify the enemy as the Taliban; he correctly calls them the insurgents because they are home grown, with only small amounts of al Qaeda and foreign presence. He emphasizes over and over that, not only is the enemy the insurgents, who are made up of Afghan citizens who are out of work, been wronged by the government or NATO, and religious and tribal forces, but the enemy is also the government itself.
The problem with the strategy lies with Hamid Karzai, the current President of Afghanistan, who recently ran for re-election against former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. Karzai, who received 54% of the vote versus Abdullah’s 28%, is accused of rigging the election, something he really didn’t have to do considering that he is Pashtun, and the Pashtun make up 42% of the population, while his rival Abdullah has ties to the Tajik, an ethnic minority. Even so, Karzai, or Karzai supporters in the government (Karzai stuffed the government with Pashtun supporters) rigged the election to insure his re-election. The U.S. warned him not to declare victory until an impartial commission assesses the vote and decides if a new election between Karzai and Abdullah will be needed.
President Obama is taking is time deciding what to do, much to the chagrin of some in the Pentagon who leaked this memo to put pressure on the President to send more troops. But the President’s chief advisors, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Admiral Michael Mullen, know that to do anything before the Afghan election is settled would be wrong.
Patience, not recklessness, is a virtue.
Since the release of the memo, those on the left have used it to bolster their arguments that the Afghan war is unwinnable, and we should leave immediately before the life of another American serviceman is lost. Those on the right have used it bolster their arguments that we have to flood Afghanistan with more troops to try to recapture as much ground as possible and protect the population centers. Neither the Left nor the Right is correct in their interpretation of McChrystal’s assessment of the situation; all they’ve been doing is spouting their typical sound bites to polarize anyone within ear shot. I read the memo, and here is what McChrystal says:
1.The plan has always been to “disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan.” (Commander’s Summary)
2.“A perception that our resolve is uncertain makes the Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.”
3.“ISAF (NATO’s International Security Assistance Force) requires more forces.”
4.“The greater resources will not be sufficient to achieve success, but will enable implementation of the new strategy. Conversely, inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced.”
5.The strategy has to change from seizing territory to supporting the population. This will be done by building up the Afghan National Security Forces and partnering with them in the battle against the insurgents, putting the Afghan National Security Forces in the forefront in the interaction between the people and NATO security forces, assist in assuring that the Afghan government reaches down to the people instead of staying holed up in the capital, assist in assuring that the government is responsive to the needs of the people by providing security to the courts and local officials against the insurgents, change the focus from destroying poppies, which account for only about 4% of the insurgents income, to facilitating infrastructure growth, and promote overall stability for the general population.
6.Achieve these goals by focusing on population centers.
7.Success will be measured, not by wiping out the insurgency, but by making the population feel secure enough to turn to a legitimate, responsive, trustworthy, strong, localized Afghan government instead of the insurgents. Then, the insurgents will become irrelevant.
8.Nowhere in the memo does McChrystal identify the enemy as the Taliban; he correctly calls them the insurgents because they are home grown, with only small amounts of al Qaeda and foreign presence. He emphasizes over and over that, not only is the enemy the insurgents, who are made up of Afghan citizens who are out of work, been wronged by the government or NATO, and religious and tribal forces, but the enemy is also the government itself.
The problem with the strategy lies with Hamid Karzai, the current President of Afghanistan, who recently ran for re-election against former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. Karzai, who received 54% of the vote versus Abdullah’s 28%, is accused of rigging the election, something he really didn’t have to do considering that he is Pashtun, and the Pashtun make up 42% of the population, while his rival Abdullah has ties to the Tajik, an ethnic minority. Even so, Karzai, or Karzai supporters in the government (Karzai stuffed the government with Pashtun supporters) rigged the election to insure his re-election. The U.S. warned him not to declare victory until an impartial commission assesses the vote and decides if a new election between Karzai and Abdullah will be needed.
President Obama is taking is time deciding what to do, much to the chagrin of some in the Pentagon who leaked this memo to put pressure on the President to send more troops. But the President’s chief advisors, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Admiral Michael Mullen, know that to do anything before the Afghan election is settled would be wrong.
Patience, not recklessness, is a virtue.
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