War of Necessity vs. War of Choice
January 25th 2009 18:00
As the new Obama Administration takes the reins of the government – and with them, the heavy responsibilities at home and abroad – the President, Congress and the American public have to deal with two wars – one of necessity, one of choice – inherited from the now-departed President Bush.
The war of necessity – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) – began on October 7, 2001 after the disastrous terrorist strikes against the United States on September 11 of that same year. It was in the Taliban-controlled nation where Osama Bin-Laden and his Al Qaeda mujahedin trained, equipped and indoctrinated thousands of extremist Islamic “holy warriors” for the struggle against the “Christian crusaders” and Israel. The Taliban said Bin Laden and his cronies were, by their interpretation of Islamic law, guests that were under their protection.
Just as President Franklin D. Roosevelt was justified when he asked Congress to declare war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years earlier, President Bush acted properly when he authorized the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the government code name for a sweeping war against terrorists and the nations that sponsor them. Presently, Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, is under way in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa (including Somalia).
The former President had no choice except to conduct OEF in Afghanistan. When the international community asked the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden and his cronies, shut down the various terrorist camps and to allow U.S. inspections of all Al Qaeda facilities, Mullah Omar and his band of ultra-extremist Islamic “students” refused. In an echo of their earlier rejection of worldwide pleas for them to spare the ancient Buddhas of Bamiyan from demolition – apparently because the centuries-old statues were a violation of the prohibition against idol worship – the Taliban declared that unless the U.S. handed them proof that Bin Laden had ordered the September 11 attacks or agreed to have him tried in an Islamic court, they would not comply.
So even though Al Qaeda had assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, as a prelude to the September 11 attacks, the U.S.-led coalition (which is still comprised by 50 nations) attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 from the air, land and sea. Within two months, the allies had crippled the Taliban military, Mullah Omar was driven out of his “capital” in Kandahar, and Osama Bin Laden and his cronies were cornered in the mountains near Tora Bora, on the border with Pakistan.
The War of Choice
Unfortunately, there were those within the Bush Administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Feith, who believed they had been handed a golden opportunity to “settle scores” with Saddam Hussein.
Since his inglorious defeat in 1991 after being ejected from Kuwait by the first President Bush and a 40-plus nation coalition, Saddam remained a defiant thug who still dreamed of being a pan-Arab ruler. He stubbornly clung to the concept of rule by terror in Iraq, and he vocally supported violent Palestinian groups that carried out suicide attacks against Israel, especially during the second intifada of 2000-2002.
Saddam was also suspected of authorizing a thwarted assassination attempt against George H.W. Bush when the former President was in Kuwait. Even though President Bill Clinton had retaliated by ordering a cruise missile attack on the headquarters of Iraqi Intelligence, the second Bush Administration made it clear that it bore a grudge against the Iraqi dictator.
Knowing that the post-September 11 mood was one of fearful anxiety, Bush and his cronies tried to rally the American public and the rest of the world in an anti-Saddam crusade by various means. First, they attempted to link Iraqi intelligence with Al Qaeda. This would have been plausible if Osama Bin Laden was not a religious zealot who thought Saddam was an apostate who used Islam as a cover for his actions. Thing is, Bin Laden had once offered the Saudi government that he’d lead the forces against Iraq in Kuwait if the Royal Family kicked out the hated Americans then entering Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Storm. There was no way on Earth that Saddam would have risked his hide for a man who had offered to dethrone him, no matter if they had a common enemy.
Second, they trotted out the infamous “evidence” that Iraq still had chemical and biological weapons and was working on acquiring or building nuclear weapons. The country had had weapons of mass destruction before the first Gulf War and had used them both against Kurdish rebels and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Indeed, as Saddam’s FBI interrogator later declared, the notion that Saddam’s regime still had even a fraction of its WMD stockpile was partially the late dictator’s own doing. Knowing that his once-powerful conventional forces were a shadow of their pre-Desert Storm selves, Saddam wanted Iran to be in the dark about the possible existence of WMDs in Iraq to deter an invasion by Tehran’s Islamic forces.
This bluff, plus the failure of the CIA and other intelligence agencies to investigate claims by “Curveball” – a shifty anti-Saddam defector – and Ahmed Chalabi, a well-known Iraqi ex-pat leader, that Iraq did have WMDs, was seized upon by the Bush Administration and used as a casus belli to justify its “war of choice” in Mesopotamia.
Perhaps believing that the U.S. had beaten Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan with a relative handful of NATO forces and Northern Alliance fighters, President Bush took his “eyes off the ball” from the war of necessity and reallocated crucial American intelligence and military resources to Iraq. It was as though he were trying to replicate President Roosevelt’s strategy of a two-front war during World War II, with Iraq substituting for Germany as the prime target, and Al Qaeda sitting in for Japan as the secondary objective.
The fallacy of this strategy is that America does not have the same size Army (18 million soldiers) as it did at the height of its power in 1945. The U.S. military may be more theoretically powerful than many because of its sophisticated weapons systems and its nuclear arsenal, but its resources are not limitless. The Army and Marines are hard pressed to fight the insurgents in Iraq and the resurgent Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, and the two wars – one of necessity, the other of choice – are also straining the public’s support.
The war of necessity – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) – began on October 7, 2001 after the disastrous terrorist strikes against the United States on September 11 of that same year. It was in the Taliban-controlled nation where Osama Bin-Laden and his Al Qaeda mujahedin trained, equipped and indoctrinated thousands of extremist Islamic “holy warriors” for the struggle against the “Christian crusaders” and Israel. The Taliban said Bin Laden and his cronies were, by their interpretation of Islamic law, guests that were under their protection.
Just as President Franklin D. Roosevelt was justified when he asked Congress to declare war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years earlier, President Bush acted properly when he authorized the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the government code name for a sweeping war against terrorists and the nations that sponsor them. Presently, Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF, is under way in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa (including Somalia).
The former President had no choice except to conduct OEF in Afghanistan. When the international community asked the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden and his cronies, shut down the various terrorist camps and to allow U.S. inspections of all Al Qaeda facilities, Mullah Omar and his band of ultra-extremist Islamic “students” refused. In an echo of their earlier rejection of worldwide pleas for them to spare the ancient Buddhas of Bamiyan from demolition – apparently because the centuries-old statues were a violation of the prohibition against idol worship – the Taliban declared that unless the U.S. handed them proof that Bin Laden had ordered the September 11 attacks or agreed to have him tried in an Islamic court, they would not comply.
So even though Al Qaeda had assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, as a prelude to the September 11 attacks, the U.S.-led coalition (which is still comprised by 50 nations) attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 from the air, land and sea. Within two months, the allies had crippled the Taliban military, Mullah Omar was driven out of his “capital” in Kandahar, and Osama Bin Laden and his cronies were cornered in the mountains near Tora Bora, on the border with Pakistan.
The War of Choice
Unfortunately, there were those within the Bush Administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Feith, who believed they had been handed a golden opportunity to “settle scores” with Saddam Hussein.
Since his inglorious defeat in 1991 after being ejected from Kuwait by the first President Bush and a 40-plus nation coalition, Saddam remained a defiant thug who still dreamed of being a pan-Arab ruler. He stubbornly clung to the concept of rule by terror in Iraq, and he vocally supported violent Palestinian groups that carried out suicide attacks against Israel, especially during the second intifada of 2000-2002.
Saddam was also suspected of authorizing a thwarted assassination attempt against George H.W. Bush when the former President was in Kuwait. Even though President Bill Clinton had retaliated by ordering a cruise missile attack on the headquarters of Iraqi Intelligence, the second Bush Administration made it clear that it bore a grudge against the Iraqi dictator.
Knowing that the post-September 11 mood was one of fearful anxiety, Bush and his cronies tried to rally the American public and the rest of the world in an anti-Saddam crusade by various means. First, they attempted to link Iraqi intelligence with Al Qaeda. This would have been plausible if Osama Bin Laden was not a religious zealot who thought Saddam was an apostate who used Islam as a cover for his actions. Thing is, Bin Laden had once offered the Saudi government that he’d lead the forces against Iraq in Kuwait if the Royal Family kicked out the hated Americans then entering Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Storm. There was no way on Earth that Saddam would have risked his hide for a man who had offered to dethrone him, no matter if they had a common enemy.
Second, they trotted out the infamous “evidence” that Iraq still had chemical and biological weapons and was working on acquiring or building nuclear weapons. The country had had weapons of mass destruction before the first Gulf War and had used them both against Kurdish rebels and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Indeed, as Saddam’s FBI interrogator later declared, the notion that Saddam’s regime still had even a fraction of its WMD stockpile was partially the late dictator’s own doing. Knowing that his once-powerful conventional forces were a shadow of their pre-Desert Storm selves, Saddam wanted Iran to be in the dark about the possible existence of WMDs in Iraq to deter an invasion by Tehran’s Islamic forces.
This bluff, plus the failure of the CIA and other intelligence agencies to investigate claims by “Curveball” – a shifty anti-Saddam defector – and Ahmed Chalabi, a well-known Iraqi ex-pat leader, that Iraq did have WMDs, was seized upon by the Bush Administration and used as a casus belli to justify its “war of choice” in Mesopotamia.
Perhaps believing that the U.S. had beaten Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan with a relative handful of NATO forces and Northern Alliance fighters, President Bush took his “eyes off the ball” from the war of necessity and reallocated crucial American intelligence and military resources to Iraq. It was as though he were trying to replicate President Roosevelt’s strategy of a two-front war during World War II, with Iraq substituting for Germany as the prime target, and Al Qaeda sitting in for Japan as the secondary objective.
The fallacy of this strategy is that America does not have the same size Army (18 million soldiers) as it did at the height of its power in 1945. The U.S. military may be more theoretically powerful than many because of its sophisticated weapons systems and its nuclear arsenal, but its resources are not limitless. The Army and Marines are hard pressed to fight the insurgents in Iraq and the resurgent Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, and the two wars – one of necessity, the other of choice – are also straining the public’s support.
| 65 |
| Vote |




Add Comments

Comments (1)

Read More
Comment by Alex Diaz-Granados
on Facebook Is Evil (or i don't need to know what my ex boyfriend's new girlfriend looks like)
Random thoughts from a cluttered mind
I can sincerely say that I have been in similar situations and can really empathize with you.
Take care!